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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between the KK principle and the epistemolog-
ical theses of externalism and internalism. In particular we examine arguments from
Okasha (Analysis 73(1):80–86, 2013) and Greco (J Philos 111(4):169–197, 2014)
which deny that we can derive the denial of the KK principle from externalism.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between the KK principle and the epistemolog-
ical theses of externalism and internalism. There is often thought to be a very close
relationship between externalism and the rejection of the KK principle, on the one
hand, and between internalism and its acceptance, on the other. How strong are the
connections? The stronger proposals are: externalism entails the denial of the KK
principle; internalism entails the truth of the KK principle. We consider two prob-
lems for these proposals. First, Okasha (2013) argues that to derive such connections
one must commit the fallacy of substituting extensionally equivalent but intensionally
distinct propositions in intensional contexts. Secondly, Greco (2014) argues that his
externalist account of knowledge in fact entails the KK principle, so it cannot be that
externalism entails its negation. We argue that we should reject Greco’s argument and
that connections between internalism, externalism, and the KK principle can be found
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In its simplest formulation the KK principle asserts that, if a subject knows p, then
the subject knows that she knows p. In symbols:
Kp → KKp (KK)
Or with greater generality:
∀s∀p(Ks p → KsKs p) (KK)
where Ks p means subject s knows proposition p. Such a formulation is vulnerable to
the objection that a subject may know some proposition yet not have even considered
whether they know it; if belief is a necessary condition on knowledge, then such a
subject may know without knowing that they know. So the KK principle may be
weakened to assert that a knower is in a position to know that she knows. And so a
rough reformulation says that a subject who knows p and believes that she knows p
also knows that she knows p.1 In symbols:
Kp & BKp → KKp (weak KK)
Or, with greater generality:
∀s∀p((Ks p & BsKs p) → KsKs p) (weak KK)
where Bs p means subject s believes proposition p.2
We start by adopting the assumption that an account of knowledge can be repre-
sented as a conjunction of three conditions:
Kp ≡ (Bp & p & Xp) (the analysis of knowledge)
where X is a propositional function that takes p as an argument, and returns Xp,
which is a proposition that provides whatever the given account of knowledge claims
must be added to true belief in p to ensure knowledge in p—note that Xp may entail
Bp or p. The idea that knowledge may be informatively analysed as a conjunction of
necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient may well be a fiction. But for present
purposes it is a useful fiction, with which we can dispense in due course. The analysis
of knowledge is supposed to be a necessary truth that holds for all subjects and all
1 This weakening of KK is intended to handle the counterexample of a subject who has not considered
whether she knows p. It may also handle the more interesting counterexample raised by Conee (2016)
concerning a subject who has considered whether she knows p but does not believe that she does because
she falsely but rationally believes that knowledge is very demanding (for example by believing a false
analysis of knowledge). Conee thinks that such a subject is not in a position to know that she knows, but
that is not entirely clear to us.
2 An alternative that retains the S4 version of KK would be to understand Ks p as subject s is in a position
to know proposition p throughout. This requires understanding the analysis of knowledge in what follows
in a similar way, i.e. dropping the belief condition on knowledge in the arguments of Sect. 2.1 etc.
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propositions. So we will also articulate the analysis in the following form:
∀s∀p(Ks p ≡ (Bs p & p & Xs p)) (the analysis of knowledge)
where Xs p means subject s satisfies the condition X with respect to p.
We define externalism as the claim that for some necessary condition on knowledge,
, it is possible for some subject to know some proposition and believe that she knows
it without knowing that  holds of it with respect to her.3 In symbols:
♦∃s∃p(Ks p & BsKs p & ¬Kss p) (externalism)
In particular, an analysis of knowledge in the form given above will be an externalist
analysis of knowledge just in case it is possible that there be a subject s and proposition
p such that s knows p and s believes that Ks p, but s does not know Xs p. Internal-
ism is the denial of externalism. We acknowledge that definitions of externalism and
internalism are themselves debated. We nonetheless hold that our definitions capture
a central commitment of many approaches to this distinction—details of the relation-
ship of our definitions to other definitions and the consequences for our argument are
a topic for future discussion.4 (As we will see later, a key conclusion of this paper, is
that we need to supplement this definition to exclude analyses that while intuitively
externalist are nonetheless internalist by their own lights.)
When a subject s is in the position of knowing some proposition p but not knowing
that Xs p holds, then we say that such a subject is awitness to externalism. So external-
ism is the claim that it is possible for some subject, with respect to some proposition,
to be a witness to externalism. Internalism is the denial of externalism, so it is the
claim that it is not possible for any subject to be a witness to externalism, with respect
to any proposition.
Why investigate the connections between these two pairs of claims: internalism and
externalism, on the one hand, and KK and its negation, on the other? Partly, of course,
because much has been made of the connections, as Okasha’s extensive list of extracts
from the literature shows. But partly, as well, because it is always philosophically
productive to investigate biconditional claims. If we can establish (Internalism iff
KK), or equivalently, (Externalism iff ¬KK), then we can convert any argument for
internalism into an argument for KK, or any argument against KK into an argument
3 Arguably we should require that the condition in question is not merely necessary but essential to knowl-
edge, to avoid trivially necessary conditions, such as any necessary truth. Our argument will not be sensitive
to this choice.
4 Our definition agreeswithNozick’s account of internalism according towhich knowledge requires knowl-
edge of all the preconditions of knowledge (Nozick 1981, 281). We believe that is also aligns with the
accessibilism of BonJour (1980), with respect to justification, according to which justification depends only
on states the subject can reflectively access—though we cannot defend that belief here. The internalism-
externalism debate is often focussed on justification rather than knowledge. Our discussion, we believe,
can readily be extended to cover the relationship between internalism about justification and KK, since the
existence or otherwise of a condition  on knowledge will be the same matter as the existence or otherwise
of such a condition on justification. Note in particular that our account of externalism does not make truth
an external condition. on the assumption that knowing p entails knowing p is true. For then it is not possible
to know p without knowing p is true.
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for externalism. It turns out that we cannot establish the biconditional. But we do get
an entailment in one direction, from externalism to the denial of KK (or, equivalently,
from KK to internalism).
2 Externalism, KK, and the Intensional Fallacy
2.1 Okasha’s Reconstruction of the Standard Argument
Externalist epistemologists often argue from their externalism to the falsity of the
KK principle. Okasha has gathered numerous quotations from such epistemologists to
demonstrate the point.5 He then goes on to show that the argument from externalism
to ¬KK that provides the natural interpretation of these quotations is fallacious. The
argument Okasha (2013, 82) reconstructs is as follows:6
(1) Kp & BKp & ¬K Xp (assumption)
(2) Kp ≡ (Bp & p & Xp) (the analysis of knowledge)
(3) (Kp & BKp) → KKp (weak KK, assumed for RAA)
(4) KKp (1, 3)
(5) K (Bp & p & Xp) (2, 4)
(6) K Xp (5)
(7) ¬((Kp & BKp) → KKp) (1, 3, 6, RAA)
What licenses assumption (1) is that the analysis of knowledge, (2), is intended to
be an externalist one. We therefore consider a subject who is a witness to externalism.
For this witness, the assumption of the KK principle leads to a contradiction. Since
the KK principle is supposed to be a necessary proposition, this witness to externalism
also constitutes a counterexample to the KK principle.
However, as Okasha points out, the inference from (2) and (4) to (5) involves sub-
stituting necessary equivalents within an intensional operator, K . Such substitutions
are, however, fallacious. We cannot infer from the fact that Nadia knows that Stokely
Carmichael was taught by Toni Morrison, together with the fact that, necessarily,
Stokely Carmichael was taught by Toni Morrison iff Kwame Touré was taught by
Toni Morrison (because Stokely Carmichael is Kwame Touré), that Nadia knows that
Kwame Touré was taught by Toni Morrison. Thus, the argument fails.
2.2 An Alternative Route?
One might think that there is an alternative route to establishing that externalism
leads to denial of the KK principle, using the standard philosopher’s tool of eliciting
5 Okasha (2013, 80–1) citesWilliams (1995, 96), Dretske (2004, 176), Bird (1998, 220), Pagin (2012, 881),
Schantz (2004, 9) and Hemp (2006).
6 Okasha’s original reconstruction of the argument concerns the KK principle, rather than the weak KK
principle formulated above and used in the argument below. But nothing of substance hangs on that.
123
Internalism, Externalism, and the KK Principle
intuitions about a counterfactual set of circumstances. One would construct the story
so that it is intuitively clear that a particular set of externalist conditions for knowledge
(e.g. reliably formed true belief) is satisfied by the subject’s first order belief, but clear
also that their second order belief about their first order state does not satisfy those
conditions. For example a subject s believes p as a result of consulting a carefully
compiled and entirely factually correct encyclopaedia (all s’s first order beliefs are
generated in this way); s also believes that the encyclopaedia is reliable, but only as
a result of wishful thinking. So one might conclude that this is a case where, by the
lights of reliabilism, the subject’s first order belief is knowledge, but their second order
belief (that they know) is not.
One must be careful in deploying such an argument.
First, if sound, it would show only that a particular version of externalism (e.g.
reliabilism) entails the falsity of the KK principle, not than all externalist analyses
have this consequence. Indeed, as we discuss in the next section there are analyses of
knowledge that, on the face of it, are externalist but which in fact themselves entail
KK.
Secondly, such an argument still needs to take care to avoid falling foul of Okasha’s
criticism. It needs to be shown that s has not formed the belief ‘I know that p’ reliably.
So our judgment that s does not know that she knows p is based on two judgments
that we make: (1) our judgment that she has used an unreliable method—namely,
wishful thinking—to establish her second-order belief that her first-order belief in p
was reliably formed; and (2) our judgment that any second-order belief that she formed
concerning whether her first-order belief in p counts as knowledge must have been
formed by the same unreliable method. But judgment (2) is based on the intensional
fallacy that Okasha identifies. While it is perfectly possible that s came to believe
that her first-order belief p was reliably formed by an unreliable method, it could
simultaneously be true that s came to believe that her first-order belief p is knowledge
by a reliable method. Perhaps she came to believe that the encyclopaedia is reliable by
wishful thinking, but came to believe that she knows p by consulting a highly reliable
epistemic guru.
Thirdly, there may in any case be a route to second-order knowledge that satisfies
the relevant externalist analysis of knowledge if the first order beliefs do. Consider
a subject s who forms all her first order beliefs by reliable means, and who follows
the following rule for forming second-order beliefs: ‘If I have a first order belief p,
then believe that I know that p’ (arrogance). Subject s may have no evidence for the
reliability of arrogance, but that of course is irrelevant for the reliabilist. If s does
not misidentify her first order beliefs, then her second order beliefs will be reliably
formed, since it is true according to reliabilism that all the subject’s first order beliefs
are knowledge. And so according to reliabilism, the subject’s second order beliefs
(e.g. the belief that she knows p) are all true.7 This reinforces the preceding point—a
subject can have second order knowledge, according to reliabilism, without any true
(or false) beliefs at all regarding the reliability of the means by which their first order
beliefs are formed.
7 The soundness of this argument may depend on precisely how one articulates reliabilism and individuates
methods. Nonetheless, this shows that the ‘alternative’ route does not constitute a straightforward argument
for the rejection of KK from externalism—matters are more subtle here than is often supposed.
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This does not prove that no story can be constructed for a specific externalist analysis
of knowledge that elicits clear intuitions that there is first order knowledge (by that
analysis) but not second order knowledge while also avoiding the second and third
pitfalls. But constructing that story is not trivial, nor have we seen it done.
3 Do Some Versions of Externalism Entail KK?
Daniel Greco (2014) argues that his account of knowledge entails the KK principle
yet it is also externalist. A fortiori, externalism cannot entail the negation of the KK
principle. It would also seem to suggest that there is no interesting connection between
internalism or externalism on the one hand and KK on the other.
In our view this is mistaken. We shall see that some accounts of knowledge look to
be externalist and do entail KK. But they are poor accounts of knowledge. In particular
they make knowledge too easy. And that’s why they entail KK. On inspection we can
see that although ‘intuitively’ they are externalist accounts, by their own lights they
are internalist accounts. This is true of Greco’s account of knowledge.
3.1 A Simple Externalist Account of Knowledge that Entails KK
Let MM be the following form of externalism:
Kp ≡ (Bp & p & Mp) (MM)
where Mp is the propositionMars has two moons, regardless of what the proposition
p is. Thus, for any two propositions p and q, we have Mp ≡ Mq. That is, M is
a constant propositional function. Being a constant function, it is independent of p,
and so it generates the same third condition for Kp, KKp, KKKp, …. In particular,
Mp ≡ MKp.
Now, note that MM is externalist according to the criterion proposed above. That is,
it is intuitively possible for there to be a witness to externalism in this form: a subject
who knows some proposition, who believes that they know that proposition, but fails
to know a necessary condition on knowledge, viz. that Mars has two moons. Formally,
this witness is a subject s who for a proposition p is such that s knows p (Ks p), s
believes that s knows p (BsKs p), but s does not know that Ms p holds (¬KsMs p).
(Furthermore, such a subject must believe Ks p but not believe Ms p, for if she
believes Ms p, then all the conditions for knowing Ms p would be satisfied, namely,
BsMs p & Ms p & MsMs p, so she would know Ms p and she would not witness the
externalism of MM. Thus, we must assume that this subject cannot know MM, for if
she were to knowMMwhilst believing Ks p, then she would believe Ms p, since Ms p
is one of the conjuncts in the analysis of Ks p provided by MM. This will become
important later. In Sects. 4.1 and 4.2, we will see that, if we restrict our attention
to externalist analyses on which it is possible for the same subject to witness the
externalism of the analysis and also to know the analysis in question, then we can fill
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the gap identified by Okasha in the argument from an externalist analysis to the denial
of KK.)
For now, we have the following justification of the weakened version of KK based
on MM:
(1) Kp & BKp (assumption)
(2) Mp ≡ MKp (since M is constant)
(3) Kp ≡ (Bp & p & Mp) (MM)
(4) Kp → MKp (MM, 2)
(5) BKp & Kp & MKp (1, 4)
(6) KKp (4, MM)
Here we have derived the following from MM:
(Kp & BKp) → KKp (weaker KK principle)
This is the weak version of the KK principle that isn’t vulnerable to the obvious
counterexamples to KK that come from noting that someone might know p without
believing that they know p.Note that this argument does not suffer fromany intensional
fallacy because the substitution that yields KKp from the analysis of knowledge
involves substituting the first, outer occurrence of K , whereas the fallacy identified by
Okasha concerns the second, inner occurrence.
So our weakened version of the KK principle follows from MM. And MM is an
externalist analysis of knowledge. So externalism does not entail the denial of KK.
In fact, this is a particular instance of amore general fact that follows fromMM, and
which illustrates the shortcomings of externalist proposals that are similar to MM. It
follows from MM that, in the actual world, where Mars does indeed have two moons,
a subject knows any proposition that they truly believe. And, of course, this will be
the case for any analysis of knowledge Kp ≡ (Bp & p & Xp) where X is a constant
propositional function whose single propositional value is true at the actual world.
That is, MM makes knowledge too easy to come by. It is hardly surprising, then, that
the KK principle is satisfied.
3.2 Greco’s Argument for KK
The case of MM appears to show that we cannot hope for a general argument from
externalism to the denial of KK (although we shall revisit this later). Of course, no
externalist epistemologist would acceptMMor anything like it as a plausible candidate
for an analysis of knowledge—plausible external conditions are those that articulate
some kind of relation between the world and the subject’s belief. However, some
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externalists do propose prima facie plausible analyses of knowledge that are intuitively
externalist on our definition and which do entail KK.8
As an example, we considerGreco’s (2014) analysis of knowledge and argument for
KK based on that analysis. Greco’s analysis is indeed intuitively externalist. And the
argument forKK is valid. In this sectionwe argue that the analysis is unsatisfactory and
the argument for KKmakes question-begging and questionable assumptions about the
character of the ‘normally’ (‘in normal conditions’) operator. However, the important
conclusion, as regards the overall argument of this paper, is thatGreco’s analysis shares
a significant shortcoming with MM. Both analyses make knowledge too easy—hence
the entailment of KK is no surprise. And, in particular, that means that the supposedly
external condition ‘Xp’ is known to the subject who knows that p. Hence, although
intuitively externalist, Greco’s analysis is internalist by its own lights. This point we
discuss in the next section.
Greco’s analysis centers on the idea that knowing is amatter of carrying information.
A state X carries the information that p just in case, when conditions are normal, X
obtains only when p is true, and conditions are normal. The resulting account of
knowledge is as follows:
s knows p iff
(1) s believes p;
(2) p;
(3) conditions are normal;
(4) s is in a state X such that, in normal conditions, if s is in X , then p.
(5) s’s being in state X causes or constitutes s’s belief p.
Greco maintains that this is an externalist analysis. On this account, the condition Xs p
in the analysis of knowledge is the conjunction of (3), (4), and (5). Intuitively, this is
externalist—it is possible that there is a subject who knows p and believes that she
knows p without knowing that (3), (4), and (5) hold. For she may not even believe that
(3), (4), and (5) hold, because she does not know the correct analysis of knowledge.
Even if she does believe (3), (4), and (5) it is implausible that she must know these
because, intuitively, she might not know that conditions are normal or that her belief
p was caused or constituted by the state X .
In order to simplify the discussion, Greco idealizes by pretending that, whenever
conditions (3) and (4) are met, this causes or constitutes s’s belief p—so (3) and (4)
are taken to entail (5) and (1). While this avoids having to worry about objections to
KK that turn on the failure of belief to iterate (as we have also sought to do), it also
removes a point on which the opponent of KKmight wish to base an argument, viz. the
subject’s sensitivity to the causal/constitutive relation between the state X and their
belief. Nonetheless, we will proceed as Greco does. Note also that (3) and (4) also
entail (2). So we can take Greco’s analysis of knowledge to be just the conjunction of
(3) and (4):
8 We discuss here the argument from Greco (2014) and refer also to a similar one from Stalnaker (2015)
which both see knowledge as information-carrying. Das and Salow (2018) put forward a different argument
for KK that also claims to be consistent with externalism, which we do not consider here.
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Ks p ≡ s is in a state Xs such that N (Xs → p) & N (Greco’s analysis)
where ‘N ’ symbolizes ‘conditions are normal’ and ‘N p’ symbolizes ‘in all normal
worlds p’.
We saw that MM entails KK because M is a constant propositional function and
so, Mp ≡ MKp, for any p; hence from Mp we can infer MKp, as is used in
line 4 of the proof of KK from MM. Xs is not a constant propositional function—
there are p, q such that Xs p ≡ Xsq—but it is idempotent—that is, Xs p ≡ Xs Xs p
(where ‘Xs p’ symbolises ‘s is in a state Xs such that N (Xs → p)’). We will see
that Greco’s argument treats N as a constant function (we regard that as controversial).
So Xs p & N is equivalent to Xs Xs p & N , i.e. Ks p ≡ KsKs p. Let us see how the
proof proceeds.
We start with two lemmas.
First lemma Suppose s is in a state, Xs , such that normally, when s is in that state,
p. Then s is in a state, namely Xs , such that when s is in that state, then normally, when
s is in that state, p. We can add ‘normally’ to the preceding sentence without loss:
s is in a state, namely Xs , such that normally when s is in that state, then normally,
when s is in that state, p. Putting this together, a bit more formally: when s is in a
state Xs such that N (Xs → p) then s is in a state (namely Xs) such that N (Xs →
N (Xs → p)), i.e.
s is in a state Xs such that N (Xs → p) →
s is in a state Xs such that N (Xs → (s is in a state Xs such that
N (Xs → p)))
Second lemma N (N ) is trivially true, so any proposition P within the scope of
N may be substituted by P&N ; i.e. for any P N (P) entails N (P&N )
The proof now proceeds:
(1) Ks p (assumption)
(2) s is in a state Xs such that N (Xs → p) (1, Greco’s analysis)
(3) N (1, Greco’s analysis)
(4) s is in a state Xs such that N (Xs → (s is in a state Xs such that
N (Xs → p))) (2, first lemma)
(5) s is in a state Xs such that N (Xs → (s is in a state Xs such that
N (Xs → p) & N )) (4, second lemma)
(6) s is in a state Xs such that N (Xs → Ks p) (5, Greco’s analysis)
(7) s is in a state Xs such that N (Xs → Ks p) & N (3,6)
(8) Ks(Ks p) (7, Greco’s analysis)
(9) Ks p → Ks(Ks p) (1, 8)
While Greco’s analysis doesn’t make knowledge quite as easy to come by as MM
makes it, it does make knowledge too easy: if a subject knows any proposition at all,
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this immediately entails that conditions are normal. And thus, for any state that she
is in, and any proposition that holds normally when she is in that state, she knows
that proposition, even if she has no reason to rule out abnormal conditions. Let’s
suppose, for instance, that Aneri is travelling in Italy. She looks at the clock in Milan’s
central train station; it reads 12:05p.m. Normally, though by no means invariably, the
station clocks in Italy work well and reliably show the correct time. However, this one
doesn’t—it’s currently being fixed. But, by luck, Aneri looks up to read it at exactly
12:05p.m., the time at which it has stopped. According to Greco’s analysis, as long
as Aneri knows something—that she has hands, for instance—then conditions are
normal, and since she’s in a state that normally indicates that the time in 12:05p.m.,
she knows that it is 12:05p.m. Thus, on Greco’s analysis, as on the MM analysis,
knowledge is easy. So it is little surprise that we can establish the KK principle.
An appropriate response to this easy knowledge problem is to relativise normal
conditions either to the proposition in question or the process by which the subject’s
belief in that proposition was formed.9 Let’s consider proposition-relative normality
first.10 On this proposal, Aneri’s conditions are normal for knowing she has hands
but not normal for knowing the time by looking at the clock. This, however, renders
the proof of KK invalid. Let ‘Np’ denote the proposition that conditions are normal
relative to the proposition p. Now line 3 of the proof must read ‘Np’, whereas to
make the inference to line 5, it would have to read ‘NKs p’. So the revised proof
with relativised normality conditions is valid only if it can also be shown that normal
conditions for p are the same as or a subset of the normal conditions for Ks p—that
is, only if Np → NKs p. In order to make his account quite general, Greco declines
to say much about what makes conditions normal, and so we are not in a position to
see how such an argument might proceed. However, it appears to us that any attempt
to argue that Np entails NKs p is likely to beg the question. One would expect normal
conditions for stronger propositions to be more restrictive than normal conditions for
the weaker propositions they entail. For example, in order to know that p&q one
would need to meet the conditions for knowing p and the conditions for knowing that
q. Hence normal conditions for the conjunction must be normal for both the conjuncts,
i.e. theymust be a subset of the intersection of the two sets of normal conditions for the
conjuncts. So the question of whether normal conditions for Ks p are the same as or a
subset of the normal conditions for p is likely to turn on whether it is more demanding
to know Ks p than it is to know p. And that’s just the point at question. Deniers of
9 Goodman and Salow (2018, 191–2) have recently developed a formal account of normality that is not
binary but is ordered, and which they hold to support KK. It remains to be seen whether this account is
immune to versions of the objections mounted here.
10 This response might be thought to be implied by Greco’s contextualism, whereby a shift of context
may change what counts as normal conditions. Greco uses this to explain why KK may often seem false
although it is true, and why the safety principle seems true although it is false (Greco’s analysis entails the
falsity of safety, thereby rejecting Williamson’s Williamson (1996) safety-based anti-luminosity argument
against KK). But these are unrelated issues, since what determines context is the situation of the attributor of
knowledge whereas what is needed to avoid the easy knowledge problem is relativizing normal conditions
to the proposition believed by the subject.
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KK will say that it is more demanding; supporters will say that the demands are the
same.11
So the position is this.Greco’s proof ofKK takes normality to be a constant function.
While the proof is valid, this also makes knowledge far too easy. The latter can be
avoided by relativising normal conditions. But then the proof of KK is not valid as it
stands. A further lemma is needed that shows that normal conditions when relativised
to any proposition p include the conditions that are normal for Ks p. And the argument
for that lemma is likely to beg the very question at issue, whether the conditions under
which s knows that p include the conditions under which s knows that Ks p.
We have demonstrated the latter point for relativising normal conditions to the
proposition in question. It holds equally when we consider relativising normal con-
ditions to the process by which the subject came to believe the proposition.12 Thus,
for instance, if Aneri believes that she has hands via proprioception, and believes that
the time is 12:05p.m. via vision, then the fact that she knows she has hands only
entails she’s in a normal world with respect to the process of proprioception; it does
not entail she is in a normal world with respect to vision. Thus, the inference from her
knowledge that she has hands and her true belief that it is 12:05p.m. to her knowledge
that it is 12:05p.m. is blocked. If we relativise normality in this way, what becomes of
Greco’s argument for KK? In order for that argument to go through, we must assume
that normality relative to the process that produced the subject’s belief in p entails
normality relative to the process that produced her belief in Ks p.
It will not generally be the case that conditions normal for the process by which s
comes to believe that p are also normal for the process bywhich s comes to believe that
s knows that p. For instance, I might come to believe that it is raining by looking out
the window, while I come to believe that I know it is raining by some combination of
introspection, attending to the testimony of others about my beliefs and evidence, and
reading Greco’s paper to obtain a correct analysis of knowledge. And it is clear that
there are worlds in which my vision is functioning normally, but these other processes
are not. However, what we are concerned with is whether by knowing that p, s is
thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. (Our weak KK is an inexact
proxy for that idea.) So the question is this: is there some means of forming a belief
that Ks p that is always available to s and for which normal conditions are the same
as for her belief that p?
One might think that, from Greco’s perspective, there could be—it might be that
the very process that brings about the belief that p can bring about the belief in the
propositions Ks p, KsKs p, and so on. In that case, normality relative to the process that
produced pwould appear to entail normality relative to the process that produced Ks p,
since they are the same process! Again, though, there is a problem. For on looking at a
piece of cloth one might come to believe both that it is red and that it is scarlet. There
will be conditions under which one knows that the cloth is red but does not know that
11 Carter (2018) also draws attention to the role of the normality operator in Greco’s proof, noting that the
proof requires N to satisfy the S4 axiom: Np → NNp. Carter gives very plausible reasons for thinking
that it is false that normality iterates.
12 Greco himself suggests this amendment to his analysis briefly in a footnote, where he also claims that
his argument for KK will still go through this amendment (Greco 2014, Footnote 35, 181). As we argue
now, this is false.
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it is scarlet (there are lighting conditions under which the cloth is clearly red, but under
which one might be mistaken as to whether it is scarlet or crimson). So it will have
to be the case that normal conditions for the proposition ‘the cloth is red’ judged by
vision are different from the normal conditions for the proposition ‘the cloth is scarlet’
also judged by vision. One might well think that the relationship between Ks p and p
is similar in this regard to the relationship between ‘the cloth is scarlet’ and ‘the cloth
is red’, requiring are more restricted range of conditions that are normal in relation to
the first of each pair than in relation to the second. A defender of Greco’s proof might
deny this. As above, what will be at issue in such a dispute are just the considerations
that are the focus of existing debates about the correctness of the KK principle.
In summary, Greco’s proof of KK is in effect this. First step: as just seen, any state
is such that if conditions are normal, the subject knows they are in that state. Second
step: in the special case where the state is knowledge, that state entails, as discussed,
that conditions are indeed normal. So the subject knows that the subject knows. As
presented, Greco’s argument is valid but it also means not only that the subject knows
that she knows, she also many other things that we do not take her to know: knowledge
is too easily come by on Greco’s account. If this outcome is to be avoided, then the
amended argument is invalid.13,14
3.3 What is Externalism?
Thepreceding section presented the followingdilemma forGreco.Either one interprets
‘normal conditions’ as a constant function. In which case the proof of KK is valid.
But then the account of knowledge is implausible: it makes knowledge too easy. Or
we can relativise ‘normal conditions’, avoiding the easy knowledge problem. But then
the proof is no longer valid without supplementation by a further premise (that normal
conditions for p are also normal conditions for p) that begs the question regarding
KK.
13 Greco’s argument for KK appears also to fall foul of Okasha’s intensional fallacy. The core of the analysis
is:
s is in a state X such that N (Xs → p)
which Greco treats as an extensional context. His proof, principally the ‘first lemma’, requires that it is.
More generally, he treats knowledge as being in an informational state with respect to p. And he says
that if states A and B correlate then A carries whatever information B carries. So informational states are
extensional. But if knowledge is intensional, then his analysis is also inadequate for that reason.
14 Stalnaker (2015) presents a model of knowledge, similarly based on the idea of knowledge as a state that
carries information. A state S (of an entity that functions to carry information) carries the information that
φ (knows that φ—Kφ) iff there is an environmental state E such that (1) when certain ‘channel’ conditions
[c.f. Greco’s normal conditions] hold, state S obtains iff E obtains; (2) S obtains; (3) the channel conditions
obtain; and (4) E’s obtaining entails that φ. This entails KK because E obtains when S obtains (if the channel
conditions obtain) and so E obtains only when Kφ (if the channel conditions obtain). So when Kφ S is a
state that obtains only when Kφ (if the channel conditions obtain), so S is also a state that obtains only
when S is a state of information (knowledge) that Kφ (if the channel conditions obtain). Since if Kφ the
channel conditions do obtain, then KKφ. As in Greco’s argument, this depends on the channel conditions
for carrying the information (knowing) that φ being the same as the channel conditions for carrying the
information (knowing) that Kφ. And those who reject the KK principle will reject that assumption.
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Nonetheless, the question on which we are focussed is whether externalism is
consistent with the acceptance of KK. And if one seizes the first horn of the dilemma,
that—Greco can maintain—still shows that an externalist analysis of knowledge is
consistent with—indeed entails—the KK principle. While the analysis now looks less
convincing, the issue is whether any analysis that is externalist is consistent with KK,
not whether any analysis that is externalist and convincing is inconsistent with KK.
Matters, however, are subtle here. For the veryweaknesswe identified in the analysis
is what allows it to entail KK—the problem of easy knowledge makes knowing that
one knows (too) easy. And, we argue, this same weakness raises a question about
whether the analysis should be regarded as externalist after all.
We allowed, as Greco maintains, that his analysis is an externalist one, since intu-
itively a knower need not know that conditions are normal. By ‘intuitively’ here we are
referring to our pre-theoretic intuitions about what we can know. On the other hand,
Greco’s analysis of knowledge itself tells us the opposite. For trivially, on Greco’s
analysis a subject knows that conditions are normal when they are normal. For any
state a subject may be in is such that when conditions are normal then conditions
are normal. Parallel comments may be made about MM. MM makes it the case that
should the subject believe that Mars has twomoons, then the subject fulfils MM’s con-
ditions for knowing that Mars has two moons. Hence in both cases should the subject
know anything, the subject is in a position to know that the additional condition Xp is
fulfilled. So while both analyses are intuitively externalist, they themselves have the
consequence that they are internalist. That itself is a reason for regarding the analyses
as unsatisfactory.
This means that the description ‘externalist’ of an analysis of knowledge is ambigu-
ous. An analysis of knowledge may be regarded as externalist if:
(a) It is intuitively possible for a subject to satisfy the analysis and to be a witness to
externalism;
or if:
(b) It is possible by the lights of the analysis itself for a subject to satisfy the analysis
and to be a witness to externalism
Let us call an analysis weakly externalist if it satisfies (a) but not (b) while an analysis
is strongly externalist if it satisfies both (a) and (b).
If we are to consider the relationship between externalism and the denial of the KK
principle, we should look only at accounts of knowledge that are strongly externalist,
and exclude those such asMMandGreco’s analysis that are only weakly externalist. If
an analysis include a condition Xp that is intuitively externalist yet which the analysis
itself says is internalist, then we cannot expect that analysis to give us insight into the
relationship between externalism and the denial of KK or between internalism and its
acceptance.
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4 Amending the Connections Between Externalism, Internalism and
KK
If it were indeed the case that versions of externalism (MM, Greco’s analysis) in fact
entail KK, then we ought to conclude that there are no interesting connections between
externalism and denyingKKor between internalism and affirmingKK.However, those
accounts are only weakly externalist—they turn out to be internalist after all, if we
focus on what they themselves say about knowledge.
In this section we argue that we can recover informative connections if we focus
on what the content of the correct account of knowledge is (whatever that may be),
and ask what follows if the subject knows the correct account. This way we can avoid
the intensional fallacy indicated by Okasha.
4.1 First Amended Argument
We now return to the argument from externalism to the denial of KK that Okasha
rejects. We ask whether that argument can be amended, when restricted to accounts
of knowledge that are strongly externalist.
Okasha considers the response that the substitution is licensed by the known equiva-
lence of Kp and (Bp& p& Xp). He rejects it on the grounds that such an equivalence
is not generally known. However, it might be known to some subject who is also a
witness to externalism, and that suggests an amended version of the argument. Let g
denote a subject—call him ‘Goldman’—who knows the correct externalist analysis of
knowledge. Let q be the proposition The capital of Tanzania is Dodoma. We suppose
that this is a proposition that Goldman knows and believes that he knows, though he
doesn’t know whether that he satisfies condition X with respect to that proposition.
For example, if Xs p is the condition that s forms the belief p by a reliable method,
then we assume, following externalism, that Goldman may know that the capital of
Tanzania is Dodoma without knowing that the method by which he formed this belief
was reliable.
The original argument discussed by Okasha can be articulated in more detail thus:
(1) Kgq & BgKgq & ¬KgXgq (fact about Goldman)
(2) ∀s∀p(Ks p ≡ (Bs p & p & Xs p)) (analysis of knowledge)
(3) ∀s∀p((Ks p & BsKs p) → KsKs p) (KK, assumed for RAA)
(4) KgKgq (1, 3)
(5) Kg(Bgq & q & Xgq) (2, 4)
(6) KgXgq (5)
(7) ¬∀s∀p((Ks p & BsKs p) → KsKs p) (1, 6, RAA)
We amend the argument by replacing:
(2) ∀s∀p(Ks p ≡ (Bs p & p & Xs p))
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by:
(2′) Kg(∀s∀p(Ks p ≡ (Bs p & p & Xs p)))
which says that Goldman knows the correct (externalist) analysis of knowledge. We
then derive (5) from (4) by appealing to the closure of knowledge under known equiv-
alence. Goldman must know a particular form of externalism, such as reliabilism—it
isn’t enough for him to know that externalism is true.What’s more, it is important that,
for the particular form of externalism that Goldman knows to be true, it is possible for
a subject, such as Goldman himself, to both be a witness to externalism (if externalism
is correct) and to know the correct analysis of knowledge (assuming there is one).15
For such forms of externalism, the KK principle fails. So each of this broad class of
externalist analyses imply the falsity of the KK principle.
4.2 Second Amended Argument
In (2′), Goldman must know a form of externalism that gives necessary and sufficient
conditions on knowledge (such as reliabilism), one of which is Xp. This is what gives
the equivalence and allows us to appeal to the closure of knowledge under known
necessary equivalence. However, not all externalists believe that there is any correct
analysis of knowledge. Such externalists, such as Williamson (2000), may hold that
there are non-trivial necessary conditions on knowledge, but that these cannot be
conjoined with belief and truth to provide a sufficient condition for knowledge. This
leads us to seek a form of the argument that such externalists could use.
Above, we replaced:
(2) Kp ≡ (Bp & p & Xp)
in Okasha’s argument by:
(2′) Kg(∀s∀p(Ks p ≡ (Bs p & p & Xs p)))
Now, we replace them both by:
(2′′) Kg(∀s∀p(Ks p → Xs p))
and derive (6) directly from (2) and (4) by appealing to the closure of knowledge
under known implication. (2′′) says that Goldman knows that external condition X is
necessary for knowledge.
As above, in (2′′), the subjectmust knowaparticular formof externalism, in that they
must know that some particular external condition, X , (e.g. a reliability condition, or a
safety condition) is necessary for knowledge—it isn’t enough to know that externalism
is true. However unlike in (3′), the subject need only know that X is necessary for
knowledge. This makes it applicable to Williamson’s version of externalism too.
15 Let us return to Conee’s counterexample to KK, mentioned in footnote 1 above. Let s be a witness to
externalism. Conee’s counterexample considers the case where s has a false (and over-demanding) analysis
of knowledge, and so does not believe Ks p and a fortiori does not know Ks p. In our counterexample s
knows the correct analysis of knowledge: from s’s failure to know Xs p it follows that s fails to know Ks p.
There are of course intermediate cases where s has no beliefs about the analysis of knowledge. These are
the cases where, as Okasha’s argument shows, a witness to externalism is not always thereby a witness to
the falsity of KK.
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4.2.1 What is Knowledge Closed Under?
In the first amended argument we employed closure under known equivalence and in
the second amended argument we used closure under known implication. A number
of epistemologists deny that knowledge is always closed under known implication. Is
our argument therefore vulnerable on that count?
We think not, for we do not need such strong closure principles for our argument
to succeed. We need only that in this case—the case of the proposition q, that is, The
capital of Tanzania is Dodoma—if Goldman knows that he knows q, and he knows
that if someone knows a proposition then their belief in that proposition is reliably
formed, then Goldman can know by inference that his belief q is reliably formed (and
mutatis mutandis for other reasonable externalist proposals for necessary conditions
Xgq on Goldman’s knowing q).
This seems quite unlike the kind of case that leads some philosophers to reject
general closure principles. Many implications that are (alleged) counterexamples to
closure have the structure (p → ¬q), where p is some proposition that we think is
easily known, and q is a statement to the effect that p is false and, for reasons true
only in a remote possible world, appearances are just as if p. For example, p might
be There is a zebra in front of me and q is There is a mule in front of me cleverly
disguised as a zebra. Or p might be I have two hands and q is I am a brain in a vat
being deceived into thinking I have two hands. Although in each case I know p, and
I know that p implies ¬q, I don’t know that the sceptical scenario presented by q is
false (so the objection claims). Our example doesn’t have anything like that structure.
In the relevant known conditional—If Goldman knows p, then Goldman’s belief p is
reliably formed—the consequent proposition isn’t the negation of a proposition that is
true only in a remote possible world where things appear to Goldman as they actually
appear here.
Consequently, the standard analyses of why closure fails (if indeed it does fail)
do not apply to our case. For example, according to Nozick’s analysis of knowledge,
where the following tracking condition is a necessary condition on knowledge, closure
fails because the antecedent can satisfy the tracking condition while the consequent
fails.
If p were false, s would not believe p (tracking)
Wewill write Ts pwhen this holds. The tracking condition can hold for There is a zebra
in front of me but fail for It is not the case that there is a mule in front of me cleverly
disguised as a zebra. It can hold for I have two hands but fail for I am a brain in a vat
being deceived into thinking I have two hands. And in general it can hold of a belief
in the antecedent p of a conditional (p → ¬q) and not of a belief in the consequent
of that conditional ¬q if (1) the closest ¬p-world is one in which the subject doesn’t
form the belief in p, and (2) the closest q-world is one in which the subject does form
the belief in p (and therefore the belief in ¬q). Both of these conditions hold for the
zebra case and the hands case. What about the case of Goldman and the capital of
Tanzania? The closest world in which Goldman doesn’t know q is one in which he
doesn’t come to believe that he knows it—that is, the closest ¬Kgq-world is also a
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¬BgKgq-world. But the closest world in which Goldman’s belief in q doesn’t satisfy
tracking is also a world in which he doesn’t come to believe that he knows q—that
is, the closest ¬Tgq-world is also a ¬BgKgq-world, and therefore a ¬BgTgq-world.
That is, any route by which Goldman comes to believe Kgq is sensitive not only to
the truth of Kgq but also to the truth of Tgq. This distinguishes Goldman’s case from
that of the zebra. The method by which you come to believe that there is a zebra in
front of you is sensitive to whether there is a zebra in front of you, but not sensitive to
whether there is a cleverly painted mule in front of you.
Now, the observations of the preceding paragraph only show that the instance of
the knowledge closure principle that we need for our argument from externalism to
the negation of KK is not one of the family of instances of that principle that has
been questioned by appealing to sceptical hypotheses and analysed using Nozick’s
tracking analysis of knowledge. This does not establish that it is true. How are we to
do that? First, it is worth noting that there are externalist analyses of knowledge on
which the instance of the closure principle in question is false. For example, let Xs p
be the condition that s’s belief p is formed directly by reliable perception, memory, or
testimony. Now, this is an externalist condition, if we understand ‘reliable’ as exter-
nalists do. And trivially that condition rejects closure because it rejects all knowledge
by inference, including in the case that interests us here. However, it is an implausible
account of knowledge precisely because it rejects all such knowledge. We can reject
it because it radically disagrees with our intuitions about knowledge—it says that cer-
tain beliefs aren’t knowledge that intuitively we take to be knowledge. And ultimately
this is also how we can see that the instance of the knowledge closure principle that
we need is true. The instances of the closure principle that have been questioned are
questioned not primarily because they fail by the lights of a particular detailed account
of knowledge, such as the tracking account offered by Nozick, but rather because they
fail when tested against our intuitions. Intuitively, I know that I have two hands; and,
again intuitively, I don’t know that I’m not a brain in vat being deceived into thinking
that I have two hands; therefore, we reject the instance of the closure principle that
allows us to infer the latter knowledge from the former. By the same token, we can
trust the instance of the closure principle that allows Goldman to infer from the fact
that he knows q to the fact that his belief in q is reliably formed, or satisfies tracking or
whichever other condition he knows to be necessary for knowledge, because it agrees
with our intuitions.
4.3 Internalism, KK, and the Intensional Fallacy
The upshot of our arguments so far is that externalism does entail the falsity of the KK
principle (at least in its weaker form), so long as externalism allows it to be possible for
a subject to know of some strongly externalist condition that it is a necessary condition
on knowledge.
In this section, we turn to the converse claim. That is, we ask whether internalism—
the negation of externalism—entails KK. Okasha (2013, 84) reconstructs the usual
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argument for that claim as follows:
(1) Kp (assumption)
(2) Kp ≡ (Bp & p & Xp) (the analysis of knowledge)
(3) Bp (1, 2)
(4) K Bp (3, assume Bp → K Bp)
(5) K Xp (1, 2, internalism)
(6) K (Bp & p & Xp) (1, 4, 5)
(7) KKp (2, 6)
Just as Okasha’s reconstruction of the argument from externalism to the denial of
KK committed the intentional fallacy, so does this. In this case, it occurs in the move
from (6) to (7).16
Here is the argument in more detail:
(1)Kt p (assumption)
(2) ∀s∀p(Ks p ≡ (Bs p & p & Xs p)) (the analysis of knowledge)
(3) Bt p (1, 2)
(4) Kt Bt p (3, assume Bp → K Bp)
(5) Kt Xt p (1, 2, internalism)
(6) Kt (Bt p & p & Xt p) (1, 4, 5)
(7) Kt Kt p (2, 6)
Now, in order to amend this argument so that it avoids the intentional fallacy, we
must replace:
(2) ∀s∀p(Ks p ≡ (Bs p & p & Xs p)) (the analysis of knowledge)
16 Note also that this argument requires the assumption that if an subject believes p, then she knows that she
believes p. Of course, this is vulnerable to the same objection that was raised against the full KK principle at
the beginning, namely, that one might believe p without having considered whether one believes or knows
p. We can fix this aspect of the argument as follows:
(1′) Kp & BKp (assumption)
(2′) Kp ≡ (Bp & p & Xp) (the analysis of knowledge)
(3′) K Bp (1′, assume BKp → K Bp)
(4′) K Xp (1′, 2′, internalism)
(5′) K (Bp & p & Xp) (1′, 3′, 4′)
(6′) KKp (1′, 5′)
Of course, this argument establishes only weak KK—that is, Kp& BKp → KKp—but that’s what you’d
expect.
123
Internalism, Externalism, and the KK Principle
by:
(2′) ∀sKs(∀s∀p(Ks p ≡ (Bs p & p & Xs p)))
and derive (7) from (6) by closure of knowledge under known necessary equivalence.
Or, we might replace(2) by
(2′′) ∀sKs(∀s∀p((Bs p & p & Xs p) → Ks p))
and derive (7) from (6) by closure of knowledge under known implication.
However, both (2′) and (2′′) are implausible. To show that an externalist analysis of
knowledge entails the denial of the KK principle, we needed only assume that there
was one subject who knew the analysis of knowledge in question and who also knew
a proposition whilst not knowing that the proposition satisfied the third condition on
knowledge. To show that an internalist analysis of knowledge entails the KK principle,
we need to assume that all subjects know the analysis of knowledge in question. And
this is clearly too much to ask.
5 Conclusion
While some close connection between internalism v. externalism and KK v. ¬KK has
been widely assumed, a precise argument for simple relations of entailment between
these has not been forthcoming.
Indeed, the most frequently cited proposal, that externalism entails the denial of
KK, looked to be false, since it appears that there are analyses of knowledge (MM,
Greco’s analysis) that are intuitively externalist but which in fact entail KK. Closer
inspection, however, shows that these analyses are not externalist by their own lights.
That is, these analyses include a condition on knowledge, Xp, that intuitively need not
itself be known by someone who knows p. Yet, those analyses themselves entail that a
subject who knows p also knows or is in a position to know Xp. That fact challenges
both the adequacy of those analyses and their claim to be externalist. (The inadequacy
of MM is obvious; the inadequacy of Greco’s analysis is not.)
In the light of forgoing, Okasha’s challenge, that the the most plausible derivation
of a counterexample to KK from externalism commits an intensional fallacy, remains
pertinent.
Nonetheless, we have shown that for that class of externalist analyses where a sub-
ject can know the analysis to be true while also being also a witness to its externalism,
the falsity of KK does follow from that analysis plus the assumption that there is such
a subject. The same holds for the weaker assumption that holds that there is some
externalist condition on knowledge that there can be a subject who know that it is con-
dition on knowledge. That weaker assumption is plausible, if externalism is true—it
is accepted by those who deny that an analysis of knowledge is possible.
On the other hand, to construct a similar argument that a given internalist analysis
implies the truth of KK, we needed the rather stronger and less plausible assumption
that everyone knows that internalist analysis to correct.
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Hence, if externalism is true, then KK is false. And, equivalently, if KK is true then
internalism is true. But the Okasha’s argument suggests that the converse connections
cannot be established.
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